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PREFACE 
Modeling of energy systems has been an important part of 
IIASA's research.program since the formation of the Energy 
Systems Program in 1 9 7 3 .  Many important results have been 
obtained during this time, most of which have been summarized 
in the report "Energy in a Finite World" published by Ballinger 
in 1 9 8 1 .  However, the energy modeling activities are continuing 
and this paper reports previously unpublished work on a model 
(SMIOT) that simulates international oil trade. This model was 
developed in collaboration with the System and Decision Sciences 
(SDS) Area at IIASA: in this paper, Yuri Ermoliev of SDS des- 
cribes the mathematical basis of the gaming algorithm used to 
simulate the process of trade, while Alexandre Papin of the 
Energy Systems Program discusses the structure of the model and 
the philosophical background to the general approach. 
ABSTRACT 
This paper d e s c r i b e s  t h e  Simulat ion Model f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
O i l  Trade (SMIOT) developed a t  IIASA i n  1 9 7 9 .  The model i s  
designed t o  c a l c u l a t e  balanced s t a t e s  f o r  t h e  o i l  market  t a k i n g  
i n t o  account t h e  c o n f l i c t s  of i n t e r e s t s  between e x p o r t e r s  and 
between impor te rs .  One of t h e  main o b j e c t i v e s  of  t h i s  r e p o r t  i s  
t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  philosophy behind t h i s  approach; p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n -  
t i o n  i s  a l s o  p a i d  t o  t h e  gaming a lgor i thm used t o  s imu la t e  t h e  
process  of t r a d e .  
One of the most important features of the energy analysis 
conlpleted recently by the IIASA Energy Group is that meeting the 
demand for liquid fuels will continue to be a major world problem 
for at least the next 50 years. This problem has many aspects, 
one of tne most important of which is the evolution of the inter- 
national oil trade. The future of international oil trading 
is hedged about with uncertainties: what will be the long-term 
policies of oil exporters, given their desire to stretch out the 
life-time of their resources while maintaining the level of oil 
revenues? How will the increasing use of oil in the developing 
countries of Asia and Africa influence the availability of oil 
for the developed economies? Should industrialized countries 
reconsider their import policies in favor of the developing coun- 
tries, and if so, how? 
The results of the IIASA energy study throw some light on 
these uncertainties. However, the resources of the fairly small 
research group at IIASA were insufficient to pay great attention 
to this particular problem, not least because of the lack of an 
appropriate model to assist in such an analysis. 
This situation has now been rectified: the so-called 
Simulation Model for International Oil Trade (SMIOT) has been 
- - - - - 
aeveloped at IIASA, and is the subject of this paper. The model 
is designed to provide an aggregate assessment of long-term trends 
in international oil prices and flows under varying conditions of 
economic and energy development. It should be noted, however, 
that interest in this field grew rapidly during the 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  with 
the result that a large number of models of the world oil market 
are now available (see, for example, Choucri (1 981 ) , Gately (1 98 1 ) , 
Kilgore (1 977) , Salant ( 1976) , and Chichilnislcy (1 931 ) ) . SMIOT 
has a number of features in common with some of these approaches. 
The main purpose of this paper is not to give a detailed 
description of particular features of SMIOT, but rather, as it is 
the first publication on the subject, to discuss the philosophy 
of this approach to international oil trade. Special attention 
is given to the gaming-type algorithm used to simulate the pro- 
cess of trade. This algorithm was designed to take into considera- 
tion the conflicts of interest among exporters and importers of 
oil, and the impacts of these conflicts on global oil trade 
patterns. 
1. BASIC FEATURES OF TEE APPROACH TO OIL TRADE 
1.1. The scope of the approach 
The prices and international flows of oil over time may be 
taken to characterize the evolution of the world oil trade over 
the long term. These parameters are highly interdependent, and 
are also affected by various national and international factors. 
The factors that influence the long-term development of inter- 
national oil trade d i r e c t l y  are the possibility and cost of pro- 
aucing, substituting, and conserving liquid fuels at the national 
or supranational (regional) levels (see Figure 1). An example is 
the possibility of developing unconventional sources of liquid 
fuel in certain parts of the world--under certain circumstances, 
these sources would be capable of halting the rise in international 
oil prices over the long term (Hafele, 1981, pp. 541-545). These 
factors represent technological and economic interfaces in the 
liquid fuel production and consumption sectors of the national/ 
regional energy systems, and as such, they reflect the competitive 
background of a country (region) in world oil trade. We shall 
therefore describe them as d i r e c t  c o m p e t i t i v e  f a c t o r s  (or 
relationships) in the oil market. 
Another group of d i r e c t  factors shown in Figure 1 is 
concerned with the n o n - c o m p e t i t i v e  b e h a v i o r  of oil trade partners. 
This occurs when a number of traders form a.coalition which dic- 
tates all or part of their behavior in the oil market. It is 
clear that non-competitive behavior of this type can exert a 
strong influence on the world oil market. 
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There is one more group of factors of, perhaps, even greater 
importance, which acts indirectly through the other groups. This 
includes factors of both a competitive and a non-competitive 
nature, such as objectives and patterns of national economic deve- 
lopment, the cost of basic economic products and services, the 
availability and location of energy resources, patterns of overall 
world traae, and the political environment (see Figure 1). These 
factors may act in a number of ways, which can be' classified as 
follows : 
1. Through interaction of the oil market with other global and 
local markets for energy and non-energy products. 
2. Through intentional subordination by an oil trader of its 
competitive behavior to macroeconomic and political goals. 
For example, any changes in the cost of capital, labor, or 
basic materials will undoubtedly have a strong influence on the 
international price of oil. These changes are themselves believed 
to be caused by changes in the patterns of world trade and national 
economic development. 
But even this is a simplification. Figure 1 does not show 
the feedbacks of the patterns of international oil trade to 
national economies and their energy sectors, or to the evolution 
of worla trade. However, these links do exist and they make the 
picture still more complex. 
Any study of the long-term future of international oil trade 
should take all of these factors and feedbacks into consideration. 
however, since the problem is very complex it must be decomposed 
in some way before it can be modeled. Figure 2 shows one possible 
decomposition - it is by no means the only possibility, and is not 
necessarily the best. however, one part of the decomposition 
seems obvious, i.e., separating the national and international 
aspects of energy and economic development. We must then consider 
whether it is necessary (or desirable) to decompose the problem 
still further. 
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Figure  2 .  P o s s i b l e  decomposition of t h e  o i l  t r a d e  problem. 
In our opinion, further decomposition is both necessary and 
desirable. It is unlikely that a single model for world trade 
would be able to analyze both the specific problems of interna- 
tional oil trade and world trade in other products and services. 
Such a model would either be too rough to take into account all of 
the links and feedbacks in the markets for particular goods, or 
it would be too detailed to be feasible in terns of computerization 
and analysis. 
It seems much more promising to link an aggregated world 
trade model with a set of models dealing with markets for certain 
essential energy and non-energy products and services (as shown 
in Figure 2). In this type of system the international oil trade 
model should: 
- describe direct competitive factors in the oil market; 
- simulate the non-competitive behavior of oil traders; 
- take indirect factors into account. 
The Simulation Model for International Oil Trade (SMIOT) 
has been designed to meet these requirements. Eowever, it should 
be noted that the rest of the ideal model system illustrated in 
Figure 2 is purely hypothetical - the other models do not actually 
exist. Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to adopt 
a scenario approach to world oil trade, in which SMIOT would act 
as a simulator, forecasting the consequences of various possible 
policies, situations, or developments at the national or regional 
level. An analyst would then generalize the responses of the 
model to the various assumptions made in the scenarios. 
1.2. Introduction of direct competitive factors 
We shall divide the world into a number of groups of 
countries, which we shall call regions. Let each region be charac- 
terized by a set of functions (one for each time point considered) 
reflecting the rates of domestic production of liquid fuels from 
all available sources at varying production costs. These are 
generally increasing convex functions, as illustrated in Figure 3(a) 
(increasing curve). We shall call this type of function the 
production-cost function (PCF) . 
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We shall also assume the existence of another set of 
regional functions describing the demand for liquid fuels, and 
call these the demand-cost functions (DCFs). These are generally 
decreasing convex functions (decreasing curve in Figure 3(a)). The 
DCFs show now much the demand for liquid fuels can be reduced 
through substitution and conservation, at the various costs that 
such measures entail. 
The shaded area between the DCF and the PCF in Figure 3(a) 
represents economic imports to a given region at varying market 
prices for liquid fuel. By analogy, we will call this function 
the i m p o r t - c o s t  f u n c t i o n  (MCF) - it is illustrated in Figure 3(b). 
The region characterized by Figure 3 (a) and 3 (b) (Importer 1 )  
has a high dependence on oil imports which, however, decreases 
with increasing costs. Many parts of the world are believed to 
be tending to this type of situation in the long term. However, 
some regions may well be able to attain self-sufficiency in 
liquid fuels at some level of cost and may even become exporters. 
This type of MCF is illustrated in Figure 3(c) (Importer 2). 
Still other regions export large quantities of oil and are charac- 
terized by their export-cost functions (XCFs) rather than their 
MCF. This case is shown in Figure 3(d) (increasing curve). 
It is assumed that these import/export cost functions are 
sufficient to characterize the positions of different world 
regions in the oil market. Taken together, these functions 
represent the competitive determinants of the world oil market. 
If the evolution of the oil market were modeled using only 
the relationships described above, it would lead to an i d e a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  (IE) point of the type illustrated in Figure 3(d). 
Here tne IE solution corresponds to the point where the XCF of 
the exporter and the generalized MCF for the two importers inter- 
sect. An idealistic solution of this type is clearly not likely 
to arise in practice, but it is thought to offer a basis around 
which other, more realistic, situations can be simulated. In 
, 
other words, it is believed that any realistic situation would 
represent not a full contrast to the IE but a deviation from it. 
1.3. Indirect factors 
The inairect factors are treated as exogenous constraints 
and values by using them to transform the regional import/export 
cost functions discussed above. 
For instance, any changes in the cost of capital, labor, or 
basic materials other than liquid fuels would result ultimately 
in changes in the costs of liquid fuel production and/or use 
technologies, thus affecting the slope of the PCFs and/or DCFs. 
Further, all kinds of prohibitive domestic policies concerning 
oil (for instance, policies designed to save oil, policies attempt- 
ing to reduce oil consumption and/or oil imports, and policies 
restricting spending on oil imports) can be interpreted as limits 
to the quantity of oil consumed, produced, or imported. 
If the evolution of the oil market is modeled on the basis 
of direct competitive relationships, taking account of indirect 
factors, we obtain a solution somewhat different from the previous 
one which we shall call a c o n s t r a i n e d  e q u i l i b r i u m  (CE) point. The 
difference between the CE and IE situations is illustrated in 
Figure 4 (full and dashed lines, respectively). 
1.4. Simulation of non-com~etitive behavior 
The CE solution assumes that each oil trader acts 
individually, and that his behavior is based on micro and macro- 
economic domestic considerations. In this sense, therefore, it 
can be considered as an extreme situation--potentially feasible 
but not very likely to occur in the long term. Another feasible 
extreme is the dominance of oil importers over exporters, which 
could occur if the importers were to act in unison. In this 
case, the driving force in the oil market would be the maximiza- 
tion of the economic benefits from oil trade for the whole group 
of oil importers. Some point MM (importers' monopoly) along the 
generalized XCF would be the outcome in this situation (see 
Figure 4). Finally, if the exporters were to act as a unit, they 
would dominate the importers; the driving force in the oil market 
would be the maximization of the total oil revenues received by 
the exporters, and the situation would be represented by XM 
(exporters' monopoly) on the generalized MCF (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Possible market situations, 
The three extreme situations described above define the 
limits to all possible trade agreements among oil exporters and 
importers, represented by the region CE-MM-XM-CE in Figure 4. 
Any point in this region implies a certain level of non-competitive 
behavior on the part of the traders. For example, although the 
points along the MCF in the range XM-CE are all based on the 
assumption that the exporters are dominant, each of these points 
corresponds to a different level of competitiveness among the 
exporters, ranging from no coalitions at all to a complete mono- 
poly. The points in the range MM-CE along'the XCF correspond to 
analogous levels of competitiveness among importers in an importer- 
dominated market. It is easy to see that the points on the line 
MM-XM represent various compromises between the two monopolies. 
Finally, the points inside the region defined by these three 
lines represent all possible combinations of coalitions in a 
nondominated market. 
When modeling the oil market, it would be useful to be able 
to simulate the situations corresponding to all of the points in 
the region CE-r4M-XM-CE discussed above. However, SMIOT does not 
do this, since we have limited the range of situations studied to 
those believed to be more likely. It has basically been assumed 
that the present economic and political power of the oil exporters 
will be maintained in the future because: 
- the dependence of the developed economies on oil imports 
is expected to decrease quite slowly despite vigorous 
attempts by the importers to reduce this dependence as 
rapidly as possible; and 
- the demand of the developing countries for world oil 
resources is expected to grow very rapidly. 
This assumption means that the oil trade alternatives 
simulated in the model are limited to those corresponding to 
points on the line XM-CE in Figure 4. The simulation algorithm 
used in SMIOT identifies certain points in this range with speci- 
fied cartel relations among oil exporters. By varying the values 
of a few simulation parameters, it is possible to move from one 
of these points to other points which imply different relations 
among exporters. It is thus possible to examine points throughout 
the XM-CE range. 
2. OIL TRADE SIMULATION ALGORITHM 
2.1 .  Core assumptions 
The basic assumptions of our world oil trade model are as 
follows : 
1 .  The oil market will remain an exporters' market. 
2. Importers can prevent excessive growth in oil prices by 
reducing their imports. 
3. Allocation of given oil imports among the importers 
will obey the constrained equilibrium conditions defined 
above. 
4. The driving force in the market is the maximization of 
oil revenues by each exporter, under certain conditions 
reflecting the interdependence of their export policies. 
The first assumption has been discussed above. It basically 
states that exporters are free to choose their trade agreements 
from those represented by the region CE-XM-MM-CE (see Figure 4). 
Since the best feasible exporters' alternative to any point A 
within this region is its vertical projection B on the MCF, the 
exporters can reasonably limit themselves to the alternatives 
lying along the MCF. 
The second assumption implies that the alternatives above 
the MCF are not feasible for the exporters. If the exporters try 
to impose an agreement C that is not economic for the importers, 
the latter may respond by reducing their imports by an amount 
equivalent to projecting point C horizontally onto the MCF (point 
D in Figure 4). 
The third assumption implies that the whole group of 
importing regions may be regarded as one entity, and is obviously 
a simplification. This assumption is adopted for the simple reason 
that the model can then be run on a small computer. Other kinds 
of competition between importers can be simuZated by performing 
multiple runs of the model under a number of fixed assumptions 
concerning the availability and cost of oil exports. 
The fourth assumption is that the general intention of any 
exporter is to maximize its own revenues. However, if each of 
the exporters followed this policy, the result would be a CE situa- 
tion in the market. The outcome for any individual exporter 
would be better if it partially waived its own interests and com- 
promised with other exporters. The character of the compromise 
between the exporters and the way in which it is reached are 
describea in the next section. 
2.2. General description of the algorithm 
In order to understand how the algorithm works, it is 
necessary to answer the following questions: 
1. What is meant by "maximization of oil revenues by an 
exporter" and how is this modeled? 
2. How is the interdependence of the exporters' market 
policies interpreted? 
3. How is the compromise between exporters defined and 
reached? 
To answer these questions, let us first consider the simple 
case of a market consisting of one exporter and one importer, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. The exporter is represented by its DCF, 
a series of PCFs (Figure 5(a)), and a series of XCFs (Figure 5(b), 
increasing curves). The importer is characterized only by its 
MCF (Figure 5 (b) , decreasing curve) . 
The PCFs described in Section 1.2. reflect oil production 
rates which should be attainable at a particular time given the 
availability of resources at varying production costs. This func- 
tion is shown by the dashed line in Figure 5(a). The XCF corres- 
ponaing to this curve is given by the dashed line in Figure 5(b); 
this gives rise to an IE situation in the market. However, eco- 
nomic and political considerations in the exporting regions may 
well reduce maximum production and export rates to the PCF and 
XCF labeled vmaX and x max in Z'igure 5, thus defining a CE 
situation in the market. 

There a r e  a l s o  t echno log ica l  l i m i t s  t o  minimum o i l  
product ion and expor t  r a t e s  ( t h e  dashed a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h e  PCF 
and XCF on t h e  f a r  l e f t  of each p a r t  of F igu re  5 )  which a r e  
g e n e r a l l y  determined by t h e  product ion r a t e s  achieved i n  prev ious  
yea r s .  Economic and p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  may move t h e s e  lower 
bounds t o  t h e  r i g h t  t o  g i v e  t h e  bold cont inuous l i n e s  l a b e l e d  
v  and x  i n  F igure  5. 
min min 
I n  t h e  c a s e  of a  s i n g l e  e x p o r t e r ,  t h e  compet i t ive  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of t h e  e x p o r t e r  a r e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  d r i v i n g  f o r c e  
behind h i s  cho ice  of o i l  p roduc t ion  and e x p o r t  r a t e s  (which must 
however l i e  i n  t h e  adrnissi.ble r a n g e ) .  Assuming t h a t  t h e  e x p o r t e r  
dominates t h e  market ,  and given t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  i m p o r t e r ' s  
MCF, any o i l  p roduc t ion  r a t e  v  and o i l  expor t  s t r a t e g y  x  chosen by 
t h e  e x p o r t e r  w i th in  t h e  admiss ib le  range w i l l  d e f i n e  t h e  market 
p r i c e  of o i l  r ( x )  . 
The amount of o i l  exported i n  accordance wi th  any expor t  
s t r a t e g y  x  m u l t i p l i e d  by t h e  market p r i c e  r ( x )  g i v e s  t h e  g ros s  
revenue r ece ived  by t h e  e x p o r t e r .  The n e t  revenue i s  c a l c u l a t e d  
by deduc t ing  t h e  sum of o i l  p roduc t ion ,  s u b s t i t u t i o n  , and conser-  
v a t i o n  c o s t s  from t h e  g ros s  revenue,  and may be r ep re sen ted  by t h e  
shaded a r e a  i n  F igure  5 ( a ) .  The model assumes t h a t  an e x p o r t e r  
bases  i t s  pre fe rences  on t h e  sum of n e t  revenues ,  and t h a t  t h i s  
sum i s  maximized by choosing between o i l  p roduc t ion  r a t e s  w i th in  
t h e  admiss ib le  range.  
Given t h e  assumptions of t h i s  approach,  it i s  only p o s s i b l e  
t o  maximize n e t  o i l  revenues i n  t h e  c a s e  of a  market wi th  a  s i n g l e  
expor t e r .  Le t  us now cons ide r  t h e  c a s e  i n  which t h e  market 
c o n s i s t s  of  two e x p o r t e r s  and one impor te r .  
This c a s e  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igure  6 .  For s i m p l i c i t y ,  each 
of t h e  e x p o r t e r s  i s  r ep re sen ted  by a  couple  of XCFs  from t h e  xnin- 
X 
max 
range.  The impor te r  i s  r ep re sen ted  by i t s  I.ICF. Four p o s s i b l e  
combinations of e x p o r t e r s '  s t r a t e g i e s  l e a d  t o  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  mar- 
k e t  p r i c e s ,  a s  shown i n  F igure  6 ( c ) .  The most important  conc lus ion  
t h a t  can be drawn from t h i s  diagram i s  t h a t  t h e  va lue  of n e t  o i l  
revenues a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  a  f i x e d  s t r a t e g y  chosen by one e x p o r t e r  
depends on t h e  s t r a t e g y  adopted by t h e  o t h e r  e x p o r t e r .  Indeed,  

Figure  6 shows t h a t  t h e  sum of n e t  revenues r ece ived  by Exporter  1 
us ing  s t r a t e g y  x1 depends on t h e  s t r a t e g y  (x2  o r  2 ; : )  chosen by 1 1 
Exporter  2 ,  and t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  two l e v e l s  of revenue 
can be q u i t e  l a r g e  (shaded a r e a  i n  F igure  6 ( a )  ) . 
Thus, t h e  o i l  expor t  s t r a t e g i e s  of d i f f e r e n t  r eg ions  a r e  
in te ruependent .  There a r e  c l e a r l y  a  number of p o s s i b l e  compromises 
between t h e  e x p o r t e r s ,  which depend upon t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  form 
a  c o a l i t i o n  and how much they  know about t h e  p o s i t i o n  of o t h e r  
e x p o r t e r s  i n  t h e  market e  about  t h e  probable  expor t  s t r a t e -  
g i e s  of  p o s s i b l e  c o m p e t i t o r s ) .  The approach adopted i n  SMIOT i s  
t o  d e f i n e  t h e  compromise between t h e  e x p o r t e r s  i n  a  g e n e r a l  form, 
from which more s p e c i f i c  c a s e s  can be de r ived  by varying c e r t a i n  
parameters .  
I n  t h i s  approach it i s  assumed t h a t  each e x p o r t e r  i s  t r y i n g  
t o  maximize i t s  own o i l  revenues ,  and,  wi th  t h i s  aim, e n t e r s  open 
m u l t i s t e p  n e g o t i a t i o n s  wi th  o t h e r  e x p o r t e r s  a s  equa l s .  The aim of 
t h e  e x p o r t e r  i n  t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  i s  t o  respond t o  t h e  expor t  
s t r a t e g i e s  of o t h e r  e x p o r t e r s  i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  s o  t h a t  i t s  own 
p r o f i t  i s  maximized. Under t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  a  s i n g l e  equ i l i b r ium 
point--a c e r t a i n  combination of e x p o r t e r s '  s t ra teg ies - - seems  t o  
e x i s t .  T h i s  p o i n t  has  t h e  fol lowing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  
1 .  Each p a r t n e r  maximizes i t s  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  wi th in  
t h e  s e t  of i t s  own admiss ib le  expor t  s t r a t e g i e s  and 
t h o s e  of o t h e r  e x p o r t e r s .  
2 .  Any u n i l a t e r a l  d e v i a t i o n  from t h i s  p o i n t  by an e x p o r t e r  
i s  followed by a  response from o t h e r  e x p o r t e r s  which 
dec reases  t h e  revenues of t h e  f i r s t  e x p o r t e r .  
We s h a l l  now show how t h i s  n e g o t i a t i o n  process  i s  s imu la t ed ,  
us ing  t h e  above example of two e x p o r t e r s  and one impor te r .  
F igure  7 shows t h e  o i l  revenue gained by each of t h e  two e x p o r t e r s  
a s  a  func t ion  of i t s  own e x p o r t s ,  on t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  
e x p o r t e r  adopts  c e r t a i n  f i x e d  expor t  s t r a t e g i e s .  
Let  Expor te r  1 t a k e  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
( t h e  r e s u l t  i s  independent of t h i s  assumpt ion) .  Since it has no 
idea  of t h e  s t r a t e g y  adopted by Exporter  2 ,  Exporter  1 can choose 
any i n i t i a l  s t r a t e g y  wi th  t h e  same degree  of conf idence.  The 

model assumes that the initiator chooses the strategy that 
maximizes its objective function--point A1 in Figure 7(a). It 
then informs the other exporter about this choice. This allows 
Exporter 2 to identify its own position as seen by Exporter 1-- 
point A; in our particular example. By optimizing its exports 
given Exporter 1's strategy, Exporter 2 finds point A2 to be the 
best alternative to point A;, and communicates its decision to 
Exporter 1. In turn, Exporter 1 identifies its new best position 
based on the choice made by Exporter 2--point A;. 
Each of these steps can be considered as one iteration in 
the negotiation process. The discrepancy between the interests 
of the exporters decreases with successive iterations until they 
come to an agreed point D, any deviation from which is profitable 
for neither of them. 
However, this description does not cover some extremely 
important points concerning the mathematical convergence of the 
algorithm, without which the overall formal validity of the 
approach may be questioned. 
These points may be listed as follows: 
1. Does the equilibrium point defined above actually exist? 
2. Is it a unique point? 
3. Is it reached by the algorithm adopted? 
These questions are examined mathematically in the next 
section. 
The algorithm described below represents only one possible 
method of simulating the behavior of exporters in the oil market. 
There are obviously other approaches which differ in their defini- 
tion of the equilibrium point, the ways in which they reach this 
point, and so on. One of these alternative algorithms is discussed 
in Section 2.4. 
2.3. Mathematical basis of the algorithm 
From the mathematical point of view, the simulation of 
international oil trade can be regarded as a problem in game 
theory. Different concepts of market equilibrium and different 
negotiation rules give rise to different formulations of the 
problem, which, when combined with appropriate iterative methods 
of solution, may be viewed as dynamic models of oil trade pro- 
cesses. These iterative procedures may vary in their complexity, 
their information requirements, and the speed with which they 
attain equilibrium. 
We shall now consider the market for a single homogeneous 
product, which we shall assume to consist of a single importer 
and a number of exporters. We also assume that the exporters 
are not allowed to enter coalitions which would influence the 
minimum price paid by the importer. 
Let i = 1.2,. . . ,n represent the exporters, fi (z) the 
marginal cost at which any exporter i produces an amount z of 
the product for sale, and r(z) the maximum price at which the 
* importer would agree to buy an amount z of the product. If xi 
denotes the amount of the product actually sold by exporter i, 
i then the revenue, I) , of exporter i can be expressed as follows: 
In choosing his strategy x each exporter wishes at least to i ' 
fulfill the condition 
Note that the terms of the problem are such that r(z) - > 0, fi(z) - > 0, 
* 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the functions fi(z) 
and r(z) Lo not vaxy over tine. 
- 
i =  l,n, and therefore exporter i can always meet the above 
condition by choosing x subject to the constraints i 
If we suppose that each exporter chooses the amount x that i 
maximizes his revenue in any market situation [characterized by 
a vector x = (xl, ... .xi,....xn) with non-negative componentsl, 
then we nave the following problem: find an equilibrium 
* * * * 
situation x = (xl,. .. ,xi,. . . ,xn) such that 
i * * * i * * - + (xl ,.. . ,xi,. . . ,xn)= max @ (xl,. .. ,xi,. .. ,xn). i = 1,n . 
x.> 0 
1- (3) 
We shall call point x* the optimal solution - it is also known 
as the Nash equilibrium point (see Luce and Raiffa, 1957). It 
should be notea that upper bounds of the type x. < 6. can be 
1 -  1 i included by constructing functions f (z), introducing ,"barriersM 
or "penalties" for xi > bi (see Figure 8). 
The simulation approach described in the preceding section 
represents one of the simplest iterative methods of solving 
problem (3). This procedure requires only sufficient information 
for each exporter to develop a new strategy: exporter i needs 
to know only the functions fi(z), r(z) and in general the amount 
produced by other exporters ( C x ) .  We snall now give a formal 
kfi k description of this scheme. 
0 The process starts by identifying the point x = ( 0 ,  ..., 0) 
as an initial approximation of the optimal solution. Each 
S 
successive approximation x (s = 1 2 . )  is defined according to 
the relationship 
S S i 
x =arg max [r(xl+ . . . +  x. + . . . +  xn)xi- Yif (z)dz] i 1 
x. > 0 
1 - 
0 
fi (X) 
i 
Figure 8. The class of functions f (x) considered. 
where 
Convergence of  p r o c e d u r e  ( 4 ) ,  i . e . ,  convergence  of  t h e  sequence  
kS r= S S * xS = ( x l , . . . , x n )  , t o  t h e  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n  x  f o l l o w s  from S = 0 '  
some a d d i t i o n a l  a s sumpt ions  concern ing  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  f i  ( ) and 
r ( * )  
From procedure  ( 4 ) ,  it i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  
W e  s h a l l  now show t h a t ,  under  c e r t a i n  a s s u m p t i o n s ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
c h a i n  of i n e q u a l i t i e s  i s  t r u e :  
L e t  x i ( y )  be  g i v e n  by 
Xi ( y )  = a r g  max [r (y  + x l x  - I f i ( z ) d z l  
x  - >-0  0  
where y > 0 .  
- 
LEMMA I Assume that 
f (a) r(z)?O, f (z)>O, - i = c ;  
(b) r(z) is a differentiable function and rl(z) < 0; 
i ic) r y - > r z , f (y) , fi (z) at any non-negative y and 
z such that y < z. 
- 
Then 
This lemma is illustrated in Figure 9. 
Proof. There are two possible cases: xi (y) > 0 or x. (y) = 0. 
1 
1. Let xi(y) > 0. Then from the optimality conditions for 
xi (y) we obtain: 
Arguing by contradiction, we suppose that xi(y) <x.(z). 
1 
Then, from the same kind of optimality condition for 
xi ( z ) , we have : 
i f (xi(z)) -r(z+xi(z)) 
x. (z) = 
1 
r' (z + xi (z) )
Since y - < z and x. (y) < x . (z) , then y + xi (y) < z + xi (z) . 
1 1 
Under the assumptions of the lemma: 

I t  t h e r e f o r e  f o l l o w s  from e q u a t i o n  ( 5 )  t h a t  
T h i s  c o n t r a u i c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  x .  ( y )  < x i ( z ) .  Thus Lemma 1  
1 
i s  v a l i d  f o r  xi ( y )  > 0. 
2 *  If xi ( Y )  = 01 t h e n  xi ( 2 )  = 0,  remembering t h a t  r ( y  + x )  - > r ( z  + x )  . 
This  comple tes  t h e  p r o o f .  
LEMMA 2 L e t  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  Lemma 1 b e  v a l i d .  Then  
- f o r  a l l  i = 1  , n  
P r o o f .  The proof  o f  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  f o l l o w s  from Lemma 1 .  
O ' > x 0  i = ~ ; ~ i .  I t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  x 2  > xi ,  xi - 
1 - 
must h o l d .  Assume a l s o  t h a t  f o r  some k > 1  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  
a r e  obeyed. W e  s h a l l  now show t h a t  
X . 
E N . 4  a, 
O X k  
k  
u E 
THEOREM 1 .  Assume t h a t  
f a )  The a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  Lemma 1 h o l d ;  
f b )  min x 2 >  i 0; 
l < i < n  
- - 
- 
( c )  T h e r e  e x i s t  numbers ai> 0, i =  l,n w h i c h  s a t i s f y  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  
i i f (z) - f (y) ,ai(z - y) for y - < z ; 
( d l  T h e r e  e x i s t  n o n - p o s i t i v e  numbers cl, c2, c3, c4 and 
* k - > 1 s u c h  t h a t  c < r' (z) - < c2 , c3 5 r" (z) - < c4 f o r  1 - 2 1 y lz(y , where  
a =  I .  
2k* - ai) max (2c2 + c4xi 
l < i < n  
2k+1 -x2k+0 for k + a  . Then xi i 
Note that requirement (b) is essential for convergence. Figure 10 
2 demonstrates this point for n = 4 and linear fl, f , f3 , f4 
1 and r. It is clear from this diagram that x: > 0 (i = 1,2,3,4) ; 
- 
2 3 1 I 
x = 0 (i= 1,2,3,4); x = x (i = 1,2,3,4) ; and so on i i i 
Note also that for the linear functions fi (2) = aiz + bi 
and r(z) = cz + d  we have c = c 2 = c ,  c 3 = c 4 =  0 . Therefore 
a =  
(n- l)c 
max (2c - ai) 
i 
and if n =  2 and c >max a then a < 1 . i ' 

Proof. Since x' > 0 for i = c, it follows from Lemma 2 i 
S - that xi > 0, i =  l,n, s - > 1 . Therefore, from the optimality 
conditions (5) we have 
Then 
2k 2k+l 2k+l 
r' (yi + xi 2k-1 + x2k) x2k - xi - r' (yi - i i 
2k-1 + x2k) i 2k+l) - fi (x2k) 
r (yi 1 - r (yfk + xfk+l) + f (xi i 
Evaluating both sides of this relationship, we obtain: 
2k+l 2k+l (a) r'(yfk+xi )xi - r (yfk-I + xi 2k) x2k i 
- 2k+1 - xZk) r1 (yfk + xi 2k+l 2k+l 
- (xi i 1 
- r' (y2k-1 + x2k) 1 i 1 
2k+1 - xfk) c2 + xfk*r'' 2k 2k+l 2k-1 < (xi 
- ( ' 1  (yi +xi - yi - x2k) i 
2k+l 2k 2k 2k-1 
< (xi - xfk) c2 + Xi C3 (yi - yi -
1 - 1 
2k-1 + x2k) 2k+l (c) r(yi 1 - r (ytk + xi = r' (*)[yi -yi - X  i 2k 2k 2k+11 2k-1 + Xi 
2k-1 2k 2 c1 (Yi 2k 2k+l) 
- yi + C2 (xi - X i 
-31 - 
(a)-(c) l e a d  t o  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  
T h a t  i s ,  
n 2k 2k-1 2k 2k+1 - x f k )  > (n-1) min (c l  + c 3 x : k ) ( ~  L ~ , ~  ( 2 c 2  + c4xi -a. i ) ( x i  1 - - Y  ) 
1 < i < n  
- - 
where y k  = zn x k 1=1 i . Then 
2k 
max ( 2 c 2  + c4xi - a i ) ( y  2k+l 2k 2k-1 2k - y2k)  - > (n-1 ) m i n  ( c l+c3x i  ) ( y  
1 < i < n  
- - 
1 < i < n  
- - 
* 2k*-1 > x2k > ,  
S i n c e  f o r  any  k ,  k: where  k > k ,  w e  have  xi 
2k* 
- i - i I w e  
o b t a i n  ( f o r  k  - > k * ) :  
2k+l - y2k < ( n  - 1 )  min  (c l  + c 3 x l k )  2k-1 
Y - ( Y - Y 2 k )  2k 
max ( 2 c 2  + c4xi - a i )  
* 2k - 1 in  - 1 )  min ( c l  + c3xi 
< ) 2k-1 2k-2) 
- 2k* ( Y - Y max ( 2 c 2  + c4xi 
- ai)  
2k+l 2k, a k-k* 2k*-1 2k*-2 
Y - Y  - ( Y - Y 1 
Since a < 1, it follows that y 2k+1 - y2k -+ 0 or indeed that 
x 2k+1 -xlk-+0 for k-+m. i 
2.4. An alternative to the alsorithm 
As noted above, it is assumed that each exporter i, at time 
st acts only on the basis of knowledge about the functions fi (z) , 
S 
r(z), and yi. However, it is possible for the exporters to choose 
S their export policies xi using broader information, obtained, for 
instance, by analyzing the derivatives of the functions fi (z) and 
r(z). With this additional assumption, convergence takes place 
under less severe conditions. One possible procedure using this 
additional information is based upon the fact that the optimality 
conditions of problem (1)-(3) resemble those of a nonlinear 
programming problem. 
Let us consider the problem in more detail. Assume that 
we have a decision vector x =  (xl,.. .,xi,. . . ,xn), x E R', a pay- i 
off function qi (x) for each player (exporter) , and a joint con- 
straint x E X. Suppose that the qi(x) are concave continuous 
functions and X is a convex compact set. We wish to find a point 
* 3: 
x* = (xl , .. . ,xi , .. . ,x:) which would satisfy the condition 
* * * * * 
x = arg max {qi (xl ,. . . ,xi ,... ,x Ixi (xl I . tX it' .. ,Xn) E X } .  i n 
There are a number of ways of solving this problem if the 
functions qi (x) are differentiable. In particular, the method 
proposed by Rosen (1960, 1961) is closely related to the well- 
known gradient projection method. However, we shall consider the 
problems which arise when the functions qi(x) are nondifferenti- 
able - this is generally the case in complex trade problems with 
uncertainties. Let us consider the function 
* 
and the point x E X  at which 
* 
The point x is generally known as the normalized equilibrium 
point. It is not difficult to prove that each normalized equili- 
brium point is also a "normal" equilibrium point, although the 
converse is not true. Thus, the problem of identifying a normalized 
equilibrium point is identical to the standard problem: 
* from which it is possible to obtain optimality conditions for x 
in a nonlinear programming form. 
Consider the vector 
A 
where @Z(~,=) denotes a generalized gradient of the function 
@ (x, z) with respect to z. Let 8g (x) be the set of g (x) . The 
general conditions of optimality for nonlinear programming problems 
then yield the relation 
* 
min max (g,x - x ) = 0 
g E  ag(x*) x E X  
as the necessary and sufficient condition for a normalized equi- 
librium point. Expression (7) suggests the existence of a vector 
* 
g(x ) such that 
* * 
max (g(x ) ,  x - x  ) = O  . 
x E X  
If the function @ is differentiable then the vector g is its 
gradient : 
Then, if 
* it can be deduced from'condition (7) that the vector x is the 
solution of the system' of"equations 
This means that, under certain conditions concerning the uniqueness 
of the normalized equilibrium point, this point can be identified 
by using an iterative procedure to solve system (8). For the 
initial problem (1)-(3), we can write down: 
Then, assuming that the function g(z) is differentiable, we have, 
For the nondifferentiable function @, it is natural to 
make use of some of the general ideas of nondifferentiable 
optimization. The specific character of the problem considered 
is such that even if @ were differentiable it would be difficult 
to construct a function which would change monotonically during 
t h e  i t e r a t i v e  p r o c e s s .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  seems r e a s o n a b l e  t o  u s e  
nonmonotonic o p t i m i z a t i o n  p rocedures  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  problems 
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  ( s e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  Ermol iev ,  1 9 8 1 ) .  
W e  s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i t e r a t i v e  p r o c e s s  (which i s  
analogous  t o  t h e  well-known g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t  me thod) :  
where il ( y )  d e n o t e s  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  of  t h e  p o i n t  y o n t o  t h e  se t  X 
X 
and p s  i s  t h e  s t e p - s i z e  m u l t i p l i e r .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  
and t h e  v e c t o r  g ( x S )  i s  d e f i n e d  by e x p r e s s i o n  ( 9 ) ,  t h e n  p rocedure  
(10)  w i l l  assume t h e  f o l l o w i n g  form: 
The r e s u l t i n g  dynamic t r a d e  p r o c e s s  ( 1 0 ' )  i m p l i e s  t h a t  each  of  
t h e  e x p o r t e r s  w i l l  change i t s  c u r r e n t  s t r a t e g y  ( a t  t ime  s )  s o  as 
t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  revenue f u n c t i o n  ( 1 )  by s t e p  p . 
S 
Before  s t u d y i n g  t h e  convergence  o f  p r o c e s s  ( l o ) ,  it i s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  make some assumpt ions  concern ing  g ( x ) .  Note f i r s t  
* 
t h a t  where ~ ( x  , x ) i s  concave w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  x ,  w e  have 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h i s  does  n o t  l e a d  t o  any c o n c l u s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  
* 
e i t h e r  t h e  s i g n  o f  ( g ( x ) ,  x  - x )  o r  t h e  convergence  of  p rocedure  
(10)  
Rosen (1960, 1961) studied the existence of normalized 
equilibrium points for differentiable functions O(x,x) and made 
the following assumption: 
i.e., g(x) is strictly decreasing. This assumption is equivalent 
to the following: 
because 
We shall therefore assume that for all xS, s = 0,1,. . . , 
generated by procedure (lo), 
* * (g(xS) , x -xS) > o for xS + X  
THEOREM 2 .  L e t  c o n d i t i o n  (12) b e  f u Z f i Z Z e d ,  and Ze t  
w 
- 
p = w . Then: llg(xs)ll < const., ~ ~ l . 0 ,  pSfO, and LS,O 
Sk s ( 1 )  a  s u b s e q u e n c e  {z }k=O o f  a  s e q u e n c e  {x &-O - e x i s t s  s u c h  
t h a t  zSk+x*; 
2 ( 2 1  i f ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  Cs,Ops , t h e n  xS+x* f o r  s+w . 
* P r o o f .  Let x be the normalized equilibrium point. Then, 
from the properties of the projection operation, we have: 
L e t  c  d e n o t e  any c o n s t a n t s .  Then 
Choose some 6 > 0 .  There a r e  two c a s e s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  any S f  
namely : 
W e  s h a l l  now show t h a t  no N e x i s t s  such  t h a t  
f o r  s > N . 
- 
I f  such  a  v a l u e  o f  N d i d  e x i s t ,  t h e n  f o r  s >  - N t h e  
r e l a t i o n  
* * n 2  s 
* s+1112<11x -xS1 l2 -6p  < l l x  - 6 e k , n p k  Ilx - x  - S - 
would h o l d  w i t h  t h e  r i g h t - h a n d  s i d e  d e c r e a s i n g  a s  s + m .  
T h i s  c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  n o n - n e g a t i v i t y  of  t h e  l e f t - h a n d  s i d e .  
Thus, a  sequence  s k =  0 , 1 ,  ..., + m  e x i s t s  such t h a t  k t  Sk 
Since p +0, it follows that for any E ~ L  0 a subsequence 
s S 
xTk of {x k} can be Soun6 such that 
Thus, 
and the proof of the first part of the theorem follows 
immediately. 
CO 
Now let ES,Op: < rn. Using (1 2) , it may be deduced 
from (13) that 
From this, we obtain the relations 
where 
This means that the sequence of values ys and, therefore, 
* s 2  the sequence of values {llx - x  I I  } converges. Since there is 
a subsequence of the sequence {xS} that converges to an opti- 
mal solution, it follows that 
and the theorem is proved. 
To conclude this section, we shall comment on condition (11) 
for vector (9) in the initial problem (1)-(3). For simplicity, 
we shall consider once again the linear functions 
i 
r(z) =cz+d ; f (z) =a.z+bi 1 
In this case we can write down: 
TI~US condition (1 1 ) holds if c < 0 and ai > 0 . 
2.5. Particular uses of the algorithm 
So far we have considered only one application of the 
algorithm - to oil exporters. However, SMIOT is not limited to 
estimating the impacts of inter-exporter compromises on oil 
trade patterns under one fixed set of assumptions. The model is 
designed to be used in a scenario-writing process, and it is there- 
fore very important to be able to vary the assumptions governing 
behavior in the oil market. 
This can be achieved in two ways: 
- by varying the simulation parameters. (This can be done 
either before or during a model run, since the model 
operates in an interactive mode.) 
- by multiple iterative model runs. 
The simulation parameters provided in the model include: 
x min - minimum admissible oil export/import strategy of i 
trader i (i=1,2,...,n) 
x max-maxirnum admissible oil export/import strategy of i 
trader i (i= 1 ,2,. .. ,n) 
ik = (k = 1 , . . . 1 ) - monopoly-like trading coalitions (importers 
or exporters) 
The first two parameters can be used to narrow or extend the 
admissible range of oil exports/imports for any region or to check 
a fixed strategy. The third type of parameter makes it possible 
to examine the effect of complete unity among certain traders--in 
the model, this type of coalition implies the aggregation of the 
regional functions into a single set and the allocation of oil 
exports/imports (and profits) among members according to IE 
criteria. 
The simulation parameters can also be varied between iterative 
runs of the model - this is a very powerful means of analysis but 
very difficult to generalize in an introductory paper of this nature. 
Some examples of the possible use of the algorithm are 
outlined in the following sections. Note that any combination of 
tnese uses is also possible. 
2.5.1. Different relations among exporters/inporters 
(i) Monopoly-like coalition 
There may be subgroups of exporters or importers with similar 
PCFs and DCFs and similar macroeconomic and political goals. 
In this case, the relations among the regions forming the sub- 
group can be approximated by those inherent in a monopoly- 
like coalition, i.e., 
- united efforts to set the price that yields maximum total 
revenues/economic effect for the coalition; 
- rationing of oil exports/imports and profits on some 
proportional basis. 
This case is simulated in SMIOT simply by introducing 
an additional trader--a monopoly--and referring to the par- 
ticipating regions as the members of this coalition. In 
doing this, SMIOT generalizes the functions of these regions 
into a single set (that is, it considers the coalition as a 
single trader) before making interregional calculations, 
and allocates oil exports/imports among the members on some 
proportional basis after these calculations have been 
carried out. There can be up to three non-intersecting 
monopolies in the model at the same time. 
(ii) Individual actions 
The model can also analyze individual actions other 
than negotiating with other traders or entering a coalition. 
These actions can be classified according to the informa- 
tion held by one trader concerning the market positions of 
other traders. The following cases can be simulated: 
1. No information is available. In this case, the outcome is 
given by the CE solution for the individual trader. (This 
is obtained by assuming xmin = xmax = x """ for all individual 
1 i i 
traders. ) 
2. Information on the admissible ranaes of other traders' 
strategies is available. This situation leads to a minimax 
solution for a given trader, and is simulated by a two-step 
use of the model. In the first step, the trader searches 
* for its best strategy xk (that is, the strategy that maxi- 
mizes its profit) under the most unfavorable assumptions 
concerning other traders' strategies--in this case, under 
rain max - xmax the assumption that x = x - i i i for all ifk, where k 
represents the tradef -under consideration. In the second step, 
* r.in max = xmax 
tne strategy x is fixed, tile assuzption xi = x  k i i 
(ifk) is replaced by,other assumptions (which depend on 
the objectives of the researcher), and the moGel is rerun. 
~ q i n  ^max 3. Information on the likely subrange x, - x l  or strategy 
*. 
xi of other traders (within the admissible range) is 
available. This situation is simulated as described in the 
preceding paragraph. 
Note that these cases can be analyzed either for exporters 
or for inporters but not for both at the same tine. 
2 . 5 2  Evaluation of fixed oil import/export strategies 
One of SMIOT's major uses will lie in the evaluation of the 
internal and external impacts of given regional oil import/export 
strategies. Under a given set of assumptions concerning oil mar- 
* 
ket conditions, the model can evaluate a strategy xk for region k, 
rain - max - * assuming x k - Xk -xk, and compare the solution with those obtained 
using other assumptions. 
3. BRIEF OUTLINE OF SMIOT AND ITS TEST RESULTS 
3.1. Basic features of SMIOT 
The basic features of SMIOT are as follows: 
1. SMIOT is an aggregated one-product model that makes all 
its physical evaluations in terms of standard barrels of 
crude oil equivalent. The barrel value of different kinds 
of liquid fuel is calculated by taking comparable input 
cost figures on crude oil production from different sources. 
2. Underlying the model is a belief in the power of market 
forces to determine the international price of oil over the 
long term - this is consistent with the anticipated increas- 
ing elasticities of liquid fuel demand and domestic supp- 
lies in the oil-importing countries. As a consequence, the 
model yields the same price for oil in all parts of the 
world. 
3. SMIOT simulates the process of trading in the world oil 
market as a game involving a number of countries or groups 
of countries (regions). The number of players is limited 
to seven (in line with the general IIASA approach to the 
energy problem described in HAfele, 1981). However, the 
composition of these regions may vary depending on the 
problem considered. 
4. SMIOT is a time-step model. It provides for a maximum of 
eleven equal time intervals, the size of which can be selec- 
ted by the researcher. We are currently using ten five- 
year periods spanning the period from 1980 to 2030. The 
solution (in terms of oil prices and regional oil produc- 
tion and consumption levels) for each period depends on 
the results obtained in preceding periods and influences 
those of later periods. The time relationships introduced 
into the model describe the depletion and changing costs 
of natural oil resources, the growth and price elasticities 
of the demand for liquid fuels, the dynamics of existing 
and new liquid fuel production capacities, and the changing 
production costs of unconventional liquid fuels. 
5. All cost-versus-quantity characteristics used in the model 
are described in piecewise linear form as a means of 
taking into account the non-linearities in the development 
of liquid fuel demand and supply. 
6. In its interactive mode, SMIOT allows variations in certain 
critical factors in regional and interregional oil trade - 
the constraints limiting the amounts of oil imported or 
exported by each trader, the extent of the traders' uncer- 
tainty about each other's policies, and the number, member- 
ship, and character of coalitions. In this way it is pos- 
sible to check a spectrum of hypotheses concerning regional 
positions in the oil market and their effects on patterns 
of world oil trade. 
7. SMIOT is represented schematically in Figure 1 3 .  At each 
time step the model first calculates curves of regional 
liquid fuel demand and supply versus cost, which reflect 
the changing domestic potential of production, substitution, 
and conservation of liquid fuels as costs increase. Taken 
together, these curves define the regional demand for 
imported oil or the availability of oil for export at vary- 
ing costs. These characteristics serve as immediate input 
data for interregional oil-balancing calculations. 
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8. SMIOT considers the regional primary demand for liquids 
in up to 6 consuming sectors. The input information 
required for each sector includes: 
- a "reference" estimate of liquid fuel demand over 
time, showing Cemand at a reference price; 
- parameters describing the price elasticity of demand. 
These data illustrate the dependence of sectoral demand for 
liquid fuels on cost, for a certain range of demand varia- 
tions over time. However, the size of the demand range 
considered at each step depends on the demand for oil 
obtained in previous time intervals. Using this information, 
SNIOT then defines total regional demand as a function of 
cost. Having carried out the interregional calculations, 
the moael produces a price-consistent set of regional 
demands for liquid fuels, both by consuming sectors and for 
the region as a whole. 
9. SMIOT distinguishes between 7 different sources of liquid 
fuel for each region. The model takes into consideration: 
- primary oil resources classified by type available at 
varying costs; 
- probable rates of addition to existing reserves of 
conventional oil, heavy oils, deep offshore oil, and 
oil made available through use of enhanced recovery 
techniques; 
- constraints on the rate of development ofunconven- 
tional liquid fuel supplies (incluGing coal lique- 
faction) as a function of the rates attained in previous 
periods ; 
- resource-to-production ratios for the development of 
conventional and deep offshore oil resources, oil 
available through the use of enhanced recovery tech- 
niques, and heavy oils accessible by conventional 
methods; also rates of production from sources developed 
in previous periods; 
- changes in the cost of producing oil from tar sands, 
shales, and coal over time. 
10. Two o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  model are p a r t i c u l a r l y  no tewor thy :  
- SMIOT c a n  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  s c a r c i t y  c o s t  ( d e f i n e d  
endogenous ly )  o f  d e p l e t i n g  t h e  o i l  r e s o u r c e s  i n  e a c h  
r e g i o n ;  
- t h e  t i m e - l a g  be tween p r i c e  r i se  and r e g i o n a l  demand 
a n d / o r  s u p p l y  r e s p o n s e  (up t o  15 y e a r s )  i s  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  model .  
3 .2 .  I l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  w i t h  SMIOT 
The p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  i s  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  way 
i n  which t h e  gaming a l g o r i t h m  works i n  p r a c t i c e ,  by g i v i n g  t h e  
r e s u l t s  o f  a few SMIOT r u n s .  To do  t h i s ,  w e  s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  one  
o f  t h e  s e v e r a l  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  s c e n a r i o s  b u i l t  w i t h  t h e  h e l p  o f  
SMIOT. A l l  o f  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  made i n  t h i s  s c e n a r i o  are  c o n s i s -  
t e n t  w i t h  t h o s e  a d o p t e d  i n  t h e  o i l  a n a l y s i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  by t h e  
IIASA Energy Group; t h e s e  are o u t l i n e d  o n  p p .  533-546 o f  t h e  
IIASA g l o b a l  e n e r g y  s t u d y  ( H a f e l e ,  1 9 8 1 ) .  The ma jo r  f e a t u r e s  o f  
t h i s  s c e n a r i o  a r e  as f o l l o w s :  
1 .  The IIASA Region V I  ( t h e  Middle  E a s t  and IJor th  A f r i c a )  
w a s  s u b d i v i d e d  i n t o  two r e g i o n s  ( V i A  and V I B )  i n  o r d e r  
t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  p o s s i b l e  g l o b a l  consequences  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
t y p e s  o f  c o a l i t i o n s  between e x p o r t e r s .  
2. The IIASA kiigh s c e n a r i o  w a s  t a k e n  as t h e  r e f e r e n c e  
case; i n  a d d i t i o n ,  a n  o i l  demand- to-pr ice  e l a s t i c i t y  
o f  0 .4  was i n t r o d u c e d  f o r  a l l  r e g i o n s . '  
3. The e s t i m a t e s  o f  u l t i m a t e l y  r e c o v e r a b l e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  
c o n v e n t i o n a l  o i l ,  and  o f  t h e  maximum b u i l d - u p  r a t e s  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  from u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  s o u r c e s  w e r e  somewhat 
less o p t i m i s t i c  t h a n  i n  t h e  IIASA s t u d y .  A t  t h e  same 
t i m e ,  t h e  c o s t s  r e l a t e d  t o  l i q u i d  f u e l  p r o d u c t i o n  
w e r e  assumed t o  b e  h i g h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  IIASA s t u d y  ( i n  
l i n e  w i t h  t h e  l a t e s t  p u b l i s h e d  estimates).  
* 
Y i i i s  Itleans t i l a t  a  1 %  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  o i l  would 
r e s u l t  i n  a 0 .4% d e c r e a s e  i n  o i l  consumpt ion .  
Figures 12, 13, and 14 illustrate the SMIOT estimates of 
interregional oil prices, price-consistent total oil exports 
from Regions VIA and VIB, and total oil revenues earned by these 
regions, for the period 1980-2030. These estimates were obtained 
under four different hypotheses concerning the behavior of the 
oil-exporting regions, namely: 
- ideal market equilibrium; 
- dominance of exporters over importers through a 
monopoly-like coalition; 
- dominance of exporters over importers through a cartel- 
like coalition; 
- exporter-dominance through a cartel-like coalition, 
as above,but with the additional assumption that 
Regions VIA and VIB have a total production ceiling 
of 30 million barrels per day through 2030. 
Although these estimates are only the results of demonstration 
runs and do not permit any far-reaching practical observations con- 
cerning long-term trends in world oil trade, they do suggest cer- 
tain methodological conclusions. As can be seen from Figures 12-14, 
market equilibrium leads to a low price in the short run 
which results, first, in accelerated depletion of conventional 
oil resources in Regions VIA and VIB and, second, in slower deve- 
lopment of unconventional liquid fuel production technologies. 
This forces the price upward in the long run. 
In the case of a monopoly, the price is high from the very 
beginning and serves as an incentive for the rapid introduction 
of new technologies in importing regions, thus preparinq for a 
shift away from oil imported from regions VIA and VIB in the long 
run. This results in the price of oil being much lower in the 
long term than in the case of market equilibrium. 
As can be seen from the diagrams, the cartel situation 
leads to a price between the two extremes. It entails more mode- 
rate use of oil from the exporting regions, as well as development 
of unconventional technologies. 
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Figure 12. Oil price estimates, 1980-2030, under different 
hypotheses concerning the behavior of exporters. 
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Figure 13. Price-consistent export policies, 1980-2030, under 
different hypotheses concerning the behavior of 
exporters. 
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Figure 14. Revenues of oil exporting. regions, 1995-2030, under 
different hypotheses concerning the behavior of 
exporters. 
From the viewpoint of the major oil producers, the cases 
described above are not very realistic since they do not take 
into account the resource-saving policy pursued by the exporters 
and result in oil revenues which may be difficult to absorb. 
Introduction of an oil production ceiling for these regions 
changes the picture considerably. This assumption yields the 
highest price in the short term and allows regions VIA and VIB 
to keep revenues at a reasonable level while exporting much less 
oil. At the same time, it is found that the rate of development 
of unconventional oil technologies in importing regions is even 
higher than in the case of a monopoly - this decreases the rates 
of price increase over the long term. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A model of a system is always less detailed than the system 
itself. This is especially true if the system, like the world 
oil market, contains informal relationships which are difficult 
to quantify. Thus, because models are only poor reflections of 
reality, they should not be expected to produce results which may 
be used immediately by decision-makers. Rather, they should be 
viewed as an auxiliary, though powerful, means of increasing the 
ability of researchers to analyze and generalize the behavior of 
systems under different external and internal conditions, and, 
therefore, as a tool providing a more substantive basis for making 
decisions. Our model is no exception to this general principle. 
This paper describes only the most recent version of the 
model, which has a number of shortcomings. These shortcomings 
are recognized and work on the final version of the model is 
continuing. 
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